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Abstract 
Taking its cues from Francisco Suarez's treatise De legibus (1612) 

and from a recent case before the International Court ofJustice, 

this article examines the parallels between the Spanish phi­

losopher's view of the jus gentium, as a law concerning both the 

relations between states and humanity as a whole, and contem­

porary trends in international jurisprudence, which reject the ex­

clusively inter-state conception of international law that shaped 

its underlying philosophy and 'practice for over three centuries 

after the Treaty ofWestphalia (1648). In the context of the grad­

ual recognition of individuals as true subjects of international 

law, resulting from the rise of humanitarian and human rights 

law and accelerated by globalisation, Suarez's vision of a strong 

complementary connection between individuals and states as 

holders ofrights and bearers ofobligations may offer some useful 

insights and perspectives for the philosophical underpinning of 

future developments in international law. 
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States, Individuals and the Jus gentium: A Recent Case 
In a recent case concerning the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, which 
was heard before the International Court ofJustice (IC]) between December 
2008 and February 2012, Germany opposed Italy on a matter that traces its 
origins to the Second World War. In 1944, soldiers belonging to the German 
Waffen-SS killed 218 men, women and children in the Greek village ofDis to­
mo in retaliation against partisan resistance. Recognising that the Distomo 
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massacre constituted a serious violation of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, the Greek courts had decided that the Federal Republic 
of Germany should pay a total of €28 million in compensation to the victims' 
families. However, this decision could not be enforced due to procedural pro­
visions in Greek law. In view of this, and after earlier claims of enforceability 
were rejected by German courts as well as the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Greek individuals concerned sought the recognition and enforce­
ment of the Greek Court's decision in Italy, which had since awarded com­
pensation to Italian victims of the German occupation. The Greek victims' 
families sought and obtained the enforceability of the decision granting them 
civil claims damages and, in November 2008, an Italian court awarded them a 
villa that belonged to a German state organisation. Germany appealed against 
this decision, claiming State Immunity, but the Italian courts rejected this ar­
gument. A month later, in December 2008, the Federal Republic of Germany 
instituted proceedings before the Ie] against the enforceability of the Italian 
court's decision. In the judgement handed down on 3 February 2012, a major­
ity of judges voted in favour of Germany's claim that the lawsuit did not fall 
under the competence ofthe Italian Courts and that therefore their rulings on 
this matter amounted to an infringement of Germany's sovereign rights and 
immunities under international law. 
The focus ofthis contribution is not on the merits of the case or on the ICJ'S 
final decision, but rather on a number ofpoints raised in two separate submis­
sions by a particular judge, Antonio Augusto Can<;ado Trindade: a Separate 
Opinion on an application submitted by Greece in the course of the proceed­
ings and a Dissenting Opinion accompanying the Court's final decision.' 
On 13 January 2011 Greece applied to the Court for permission to inter­
vene, stating clearly that it was not doing so as a litigating party in the case but 
in order to 'inform' the Court ofhow a decision of the same Court could have 
affected its legal rights and interests, since Germanywas opposing an Italian 
court's enforcement ofa previous decision by a Greek Court.'While Italy had 
no objections to Greece intervening, Germany asserted that it did not for­
mally object to it, but noted that the Application substantially contradicted the 
grounds of Greece's purported intervention under Article 62 of the Ie] Stat­
ute. Germany argued that while Greece was claiming that the Court's judge­
ment would eventually affect its interest as a State, since it related to a Greek 
judicial body, the case ultimately concerned the rights of and compensation 
to individuals, and the two were separate. In its Order, the Court eventually 
ruled in favour of Greece's Application, thus establishing what judge Can­
<;ado Trindade refers to in his Separate Opinion motivating his vote in favour 
of the Order as 'the resurrectio of intervention in contemporary international 
Separate Opinion ofJudge Can~ado Trindade (International Court ofJustice, 4 July 2011) 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/filesh43h6sS8.pdf> [accessed 2S June 2012); Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Can~ado Trindade (International Court of Justice, 3 February 2012). 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/filesh43h6891.pdf> [accessed lS June 2012]' 
The Application was submitted by Greece under Article 62 of the IeJ Statute. 
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litigation'.J The most relevant aspect of this important piece of jurisprudence 
is that the rights ofa State (Greece in this case) were seen to be in consonance 
with the rights of individuals (Greek nationals): both states and individuals 
were recognised as titulaires (bearers) of rights. This is not always the case 
in international jurisprudence, which often adopts a hierarchy of value that 
places rights of states above, rather than at par with, those of individuals. In 
his Separate Opinion, Judge Canc;:ado Trindade cites from his dissenting opin­
ion to a previous Order of the Court in the same case to back his argument 
that claims concerning rights which are inherent to human beings cannot be 
waived by States by means of inter-state agreements: 
States may, if they so wish, waive claims as to their own rights. 
But they cannot waive claims for reparation of serious breaches 
of rights that are not theirs, rights that are inherent to the hu­
man person. A purported waiver to this effect runs against the 
international ordre public, is in breach of jus cogens. This broader 
outlook, in a higher scale of values, is in line with the vision of 
the so-called "founding fathers" of the law of nations (the droit 
de gens, the jus gentium), and with what I regard as the most lucid 
trend of contemporary international legal thinking.4 
The list of works of the 'founding fathers of the law of nations' cited by 
Judge Canc;:ado Trindade includes Francisco de Vitoria's Relecciones teologicas 
(1538-39), Alberico Gentili's De jure belli (1598), Francisco Suarez's De legibus 
ac Deo legislatore (1612), Hugo Grotius' De jure belli ac pacis (1625), Samuel 
Pufendorf's De jure naturae et gentium (1672) and Christian Wolff's Jus gen­
tium methodo scientifica pertractatum (1749). The judge's succinct reference to 
Suarez's vision of the 'law of nations [which] discloses the unity and univer­
sality of humankind, and regulates the States in their relations as members 
of the universal society' captures the two complementary senses of the no­
tion of jus gentium expounded by the Doctor eximius.5 The next section will 
turn the spotlight onto this vision as it emerges in De legibus ac Deo legislatore, 
a treatise published for the first time four centuries ago. This will enable us 
to then examine the extent to which the broader outlook ofwhich this vision 
forms part may be of inspiration to what the judge considers as "the most lucid 
trend" in the contemporary philosophy and practice of international law. 
Suarez on Law, Rights and the Jus gentium 
At the age of sixteen or so, Francisco Suarez (Granada, 1548 - Lisbon, 1617) 
was among fifty young men who asked to join the Jesuits at the College of 
Salamanca. Considered at first to be below the required standards, Suarez 
Separate Opillion (4July 20ll), §6J. 
Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Can~ado Trindade (International Court ofJustice, 6 July 
2010), §178 <http://www.icj -cij .org/docket/filesI143116031.pdf> [accessed 25J une 2012]' 
Separate Opinion (4July 2Oll), §27. Suarez was given the byname Doctor eximius (Excellent 
Doctor) in the same fashion as other great theologians such as Bonaventure (Doctor seraph i­
(us) , Thomas Aquinas (Doctor ange1icu s) and Duns Scotus (Doctor sublilis). 
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was eventually admitted provisionally. During his course in philosophy he 
was called a dumb ox - an appellative that did not bode well, had it not been 
employed a couple of centuries earlier by St. Albert the Great to describe St. 
Thomas Aquinas. Suarez took his studies very seriously and eventually ex­
celled in philosophy and soon moved on to theology, the subject in which he 
became a true master. In the history ofphilosophy, he is known mostly for his 
contribution to metaphysics.6 Considered a highly intelligent scholar, but not 
a particularly gifted orator, he held a number oflectureships in both philoso­
phy and theology in Spain, until he was transferred to Rome to take up one of 
the most prestigious academic positions within the Society ofJesus, the Chair 
of Theology at the Collegium Rornanum. He later returned to Spain, where 
he taught at the universities ofAlcala, Coimbra and Salamanca. During his ~ first stay at Salamanca, the Rector of the university invited Suarez to teach a 
course on law, which dealt with the same themes discussed by his predecessor 
at that university, Franciso de Vitoria, and by two ofhis great contemporaries, 
the Dominican Domingo de Soto and the Jesuit Luis de Molina, all ofwhom • 
made important contributions to early modern legal philosophy. This course 
was published in 1612 as the treatise De legibus ac Deo legislatore (On Laws and 
God the Lawgiver).lt is divided into ten books and follows the typical scholas­
tic method of structuring the subject matter around a series ofsuccessive and 
conceptually related quaestiones and responsiones, starting with the meaning 
of the word law and the nature of the concept through to its various kinds and 
subdivisions. 
Suarez was a natural law theorist who drew his ideas primarily from Aqui­
nas but also from the long tradition that preceded him, which included the 
corpus of Roman law (in particular Justinian's Codex iuris civilis) and other 
important authors, such as Isidore of Seville. Suarez's general philosophical 
approach is that of an independent Thomist. In his general definition of law, 
for instance, he moves away from the Thomistic focus on reason and instead 
places an emphasis on the will: law, for Suarez, is 'an act ofa just and right will, 
by which a superior wills to oblige an inferior to doing this or that.'7 In his 
introduction (De legibus, bk I), the philosopher ofGranada illustrates a politi­
cal philosophy whereby political association is on the one hand natural (fol­
lOWing the Aristotelico-Thomistic view) but also a result of the will ofhuman 
beings as free agents who agree to form such associations . Human societies 
and political authority, therefore, are in a sense natural but arise also from the 
tacit or explicit consent of the people, who chose which form of government 
and which laws to adopt. This contractarian conception accounts for both 
political and legal variety. Sovereignty places each state on an equal level with 
6 For instance, his discussion of the principle of individuation, expounded in Disputationes 
M etaphysicae (1597), had a significant influence on the ideas ofLeibniz. 
7 Francisco Suarez, De lel(.ibus ac Deo legislatore, in Opera omnia, 26 vols. (Paris: L. Vives, 
1856-1866), vols. 5 and 6, lbook] I, [chapter] 5, [section] 24: '[lex est] actus voluntatis jus­
tae et rectae, quo superior vult inferiorem obligare ad hoc vel illud faciendum.' Cf. Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae , HI, q. 90, a.4: '[Lawis] an ordinance of reason for the common 
good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.' 
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other states in the exercise of its power, including its judicial power: a state 
can make its own laws, which cannot be appealed in any court or tribunal of 
another state. Yet, for Suarez, the sovereignty of the state (or the ruler, where 
the ruler embodies the state) is not absolute. In the section concerning posi­
tive law inDe legibus, he clearly lays down the parameters of the limits ofstate 
sovereignty and state intervention: civil authority should not interfere in the 
private domain offamilies and individuals, unless in function of the common 
good or the observance oflaws, because by nature they are prior to the state." 
The main principles of the jus gentium are discussed in the last four chap­
ters (17-20) of Book II ofDe legibus. One of the vexed questions in medieval 
and especially early modern natural law theory was whether the jus gentium 
pertains to the sphere ofnatural law or positive law. Thomas himselfhad been 
ambivalent, while Isidore of Seville had emphasised the customary nature of 
this kind of law. Suarez refers to it as a 'quasi-medium between natural and 
human law' insofar as it follows from, but is not quite as necessary as, natural 
law! The qualification quasi is significant because later Suarez suggests that 
the character of the jus gentium, in fact, is that ofa positive human law.'O What 
distinguishes the law of, or among, people (jus inter gentes) from the civil law 
pertaining to a particular state (jus intra gentes) is the fact that the former is 
customary while the latter is usually written. The jus gentium then, like posi­
tive law, depends on the consent of the people who recognise its principles. 
In general, Suarez speaks of the jus gentium in terms of objective rather 
than subjective rights, whereby it functions in virtue ofan objective good that 
exists prior to the law (be it written or customary). This kind ofjus (as "law") 
declares rather than creates a good that ought to be followed. But the term jus 
in jus gentium can in some cases be understood as right, i.e. as the moral fac­
ulty pertaining to individuals, such as the right to self-defence. Suarez writes: 
Jus sometimes means a moral faculty [a right] either for some­

thing or over something ... Sometimes, however, jus means a 

law, which is the rule ofacting with probity and which establishes 

a certain fairness in things and is the reason for jus as it is taken 

in the first way ... Hence, for the sake ofbrevity, we may call the 

first a beneficial right [jus utile] and the second a right that ought 

to be respected [honestum], or the first a real right and the second 

a legal right." 

Ibid., Ill , 1I, 8: 'Potestas civilis ... non dirigit oeconomicum regimen, nisi in his quae redun­

dant in commune bonum civitatis .. . Ergo simili propositione ac ratione non spectat ad 

leges civiles ... privata honestas singulorum, ut tales sunt, sed solum ea morum rectitudo 

per has leges constituitur, quae bono civile vel necessaria vel valde utilis est.' 

9 Ibid., H, 17, 1: 'quasi mediuln inter naturale jus, et hunlanum'. 
10 Ibid., lJ, 19, 3: 'Unde tandem concludi videtur jus gentium simpliciter esse humanum ac 
positivum'. 
11 Suarez, De legibus, ll, 17, 2: 'Jus enim interdum significat moralem facultatem ad rem ali­
quam, vel in Te, sive sit verum dominium, sive aliqua participatio ejus, quod est proprium 
objectum justitiae, ut constat exD. Thoma ... Aliquando vero jus significat legem, quae est 
regula honeste operandi, et in rebus quamdam aequitatem constituit, et est ratio ipsius juris 
priori modo sumpti, ut dixit ibidem D. Thomas. qua ratio est ipsa lex, ut ibi dicit, et ita 
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A real or beneficial right pertains to the subject and is thus what we may 
call a subjective right, while a legal right which imposes an obligation of obser­
vance resides outside the subject and may thus be termed an objective right, or 
law. TheJesuit philosopher does not use the term subjective rights in his works 
but he emphasises, perhaps more than any other Thomist before him, this 
element which had already been present in the Thomistic corpus. The fact 
that Suarez draws the distinction between the two meanings ofjus in the first 
of four chapters dealing specifically with the jus gentium is of course very tell­
ing, since it shows quite clearly that a proper understanding ofthis kind oflaw 
depends heavily on the complementary understanding of these two senses 
of the word. It is important to note (in view ofwhat will be argued later) the 
coincidence between these two facets of the same notion, jus, which is 'the 
proper object of justice' (proprium objectum justitiae)." 
In Suarez's view, the right to self-defence is the greatest of all subjective 
rights insofar as it is related to the most fundamental of all rights: the right to 
life. All other rights, such as the right to food for the preservation ofone's body 
and the right to security for the preservation ofone's possessions, though per­
haps less basic, function always as predicates ofthis fundamental right. These 
rights belong to all human beings and thus form the basis on which the jus gen­
tium, now taken as the law common to all mankind, serves as the reason (ra­
tio) for jus taken in the first sense as the right common to all mankind. Suarez's 
idea ofjus as a natural, moral faculty - or his doctrine of subjective rights - is 
therefore not set within the discourse of moral autonomy of individuals but 
within that of an objective moral order. In other words, natural rights always 
emanate from, and point towards, natural law as an objective moral law that 
can never be transgressed by positive law or other forms ofhuman agreement. 
State Sovereignty and the Rights Common to Mankind 
Just as jus in jus gentium can be translated as "law" or "right", the genitive gen­
tium can be (and has been) translated as "of peoples" or "of nations".'3 Here 
too, the term incorporates two different yet complementary meanings that 
together indicate the very essence of the notion of jus gentium. Suarez, like 
Grotius after him, developed his vision ofjus gentium in an attempt to over­
come the tension between Machiavellism (where the individual state, such as 
the one ruled by Cesare Borgia, is at the apex of the political process) and uni­
versal idealism (which emphasised human unity through a transcendent con­
ception oflegal obligation). In fact, for Suarez, the jus gentium is afundamental 
law that, unlike purely positive law that operates within the boundaries of a 
particular jurisdiction, is applicable among persons from different nations on 
jus coincidit cum lege, ... unde, ut habeamus brevia nomina quibus uti possimus, primum 
vocare possumus jus utile, secundum honestum: vel primum jus reale, secundum legale.' 
12 Suarez, De legibus, II, 17. 
13 Whether jus gwtiu/11 is translated as "law of nations", "law of peoples", "right of nations'· or 
"right of peoples", the English translation always loses something of the deeper meaning of 
the original term (hence my choice to retain the Latin phrase). 
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account of the fact that its principles are common to all, or at least many, com­
munities. The jus gentium has its customary origin in the laws 'which indi­
vidual states or kingdoms observe within their own border', or intra se (within 
them).14 However, this customary origin in domestic law develops into an 
understanding ofjus gentium inter se (among them), as that law which "all the 
various peoples ought to observe in their relations with each other." When 
referring to the jus gentium inter se, Suarez uses the words "omnes populi et 
gentes varias". Populi is of course peoples, which would also be the closest 
English translation ofgentes, which in turn could also mean groupings ofpeo­
pie, or communities. The point, however, is that since Suarez does not use the 
words nationes or respubliclE, it cannot be assumed that populi or gentes imply 
nations or states in the modern meaning of these terms. 
While maintaining the universality of the jus gentium that reflects the 
unity of mankind as a whole, Suarez also draws important distinctions be­
tween natural law and the jus gentium to then illustrate the latter's affirmative 
precepts and mandates, its qualified universality and above all its status as hu­
man, positive and customary law that is created by the will (voluntas) oflegis­
lators. This exposes the inner tension within the idea ofthe jus gentium: on the 
one hand it depends on the declarative force originating in the customary law 
of the many particular jurisdictions, and therefore on their respective legisla­
tors, but, on the other hand, it transcends the limits of individual states when 
jus gentium is taken as the law which binds peoples (populi, gentes) to each oth­
er, and more so when it is taken as the law common to the whole of mankind. 
It should be clear, then, that although Suarez -unlike other theorists ofthe jus 
gentium such as his predecessor Francisco de Vitoria and his contemporary 
Tommaso Campanella - tends more towards a positivistic understanding of 
the jus gentium as separate from natural law in virtue of the fact that it is writ­
ten in the form of pacts and covenants between peoples, there is also another 
sense in which its customary nature reveals the bond with natural and divine 
law." This is what makes it, as pointed out earlier, almost a median between 
natural law and positive law. 
Within the general Thomistic framework, to which Suarez and the other 
scholars of the School of Salamanca or the Second Scholastic subscribed, hu­
man positive law can never transgress or contravene a higher law. What first 
14 	 Suarez, De legibus, ll, 19, 8: 'Adde vero ad majorem declarationem, duobus modis (quantum 
ex isidoro, et aliis juribus, auctoribus colligo) dici aliquid de jure gentium, uno modo qui est 
jus, quod omnes populi, et gentes varia inter se servare debent, alio modo quia est jus, quod 
singulae civitates, vel regna intra se observant, per similitudinem autem J et convenientiam 
jus gentium appellatur.' 
15 Suarez, De legibus, il, 17, 8: 'praecepta juris gentium ad hominibus introducta sunt per ar· 
bitrium, et consensum illorum, sive in tota hominum communitatem, sive in majori parte; 
ergo non possunt dici scripta in cordibus hominum ab auctore naturae ergo sunt juris hum · 
ani, et non naturalis.' On Vitoria, see James Brown Scott, Law, the State, and the Illterna­
tiOllal Community, vol. 1 (Columbia: Columbia U.P., 1939; repr. Westport : Greenwood Press, 
1970), chapter 22; On Campanella, see Jean-Paul De Lucca, 'Ius gentium', in Encic/opedia 
Brullialla e Campallelliana, vol. 2, ed. by Eugenio Canone and Germana Ernst (Rome: Serra 
Editore, lOll), Pp.243-2S6. 
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appears as an ambivalent or even contradictory account of the jus gentium in 
the end turns out to be a careful understanding of the fact that some elements 
of the jus gentium are more closely associated with human positive law, while 
other aspects of it connect it more closely to the few, basic principles of natu­
rallaw. While insisting that one ought not to confuse the jus gentium with 
natural law, Suarez is still thinking within the Thomistic framework ofa hier­
archy oflaws wherein a lower form oflaw can never contravene a higher one.'6 
It follows, then, that for Suarez, the domestic laws of individual states can 
never contravene the jus gentium, whether it is understood as an inter-state 
law resulting from the agreement between states or a set of precepts which 
emanate from the rights common to all human beings, populi or gentes.'7 No 
one, not even a state or its laws, may violate the rights held by individuals in 
virtue of their membership in the community ofmankind. This places a limit 
on the sovereignty of the state where individual rights are concerned. This 
subject was discussed extensively by great early modern legal theorists, from 
Vitoria to Gentili and from Bodin to Grotius. 
The Doctor eximius was a strong advocate of state sovereignty, but he did 
not consider it to be absolute. In De legibus, he applies his theory of subjective 
rights to what he calls the "great question": whether subjects have the right to 
resist or depose a tyrannical ruler. While Thomists after Aquinas more or less 
relied on classical political theory to advocate the natural basis ofpolitical au­
thority and to argue, in some way or other, that a ruler who resorts to tyranny 
is a usurper and may thus be resisted and deposed on account ofhis illegitima­
cy, modern political theorists such as Hobbes and Locke were more inclined 
to base their argument for resistance on the ruler's failed adherence to the so­
cial contract to which he and his subjects were parties.'8 Suarez's argument for 
the resistance to tyrants is grounded on the jus se conservandi, i.e. the funda­
mental individual right to self-preservation.'9 Subjects may only resist or de· 
pose a ruler in those circumstances where the preservation of the community 
requires such action, and always as a form of self-defence. The right to self­
defence advocated for individual subjects is extended to states, which Suarez 
describes as natural communities of free persons who choose which form of 
government to adopt on the basis ofexperience, good custom and the exigen­
cies of the community itself.'° States, like individual subjects, have the right 
16 	 Ibid.: 'Quod si de aliquibus praeceptis juris gentium hoc necessario fatendum est, ut os­
tendemus, non opportet jus gentium cum naturali confundere, nec propter solas illationes 
etiam plures ita vocare jus illud, quod simpliciter naturale est ... ' 
17 In virtue of the pacta sllnt ser)Janda (agreements are to be observed) principle, which is still 
today one of the main principles of international law. 
18 	 Suarez has sometimes been cred ited with offering an earlier version of the social contract, 
and his views on the right to resist are closely related to the contractarian principle which 
he formulates as the pactum subjectionis (political contract) and pactum IIIlionis (contract of 
association), which bind rulers and subjects, and subjects among themselves respectively. 
19 	 This position was common among early modern natural law theorists, such as Domingo de 
Soto tsee Annabel S. Brett, Changes ofState . Nature and tile Limits oftile City ill Early Modern 
Natural Law. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U. P., lOll), p.20. 
20 	 See Suarez, De legibus, Ill, 4, I. 
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to defend themselves against external threats to their very existence and, just 
as individuals may rightfully defend their property and goods as an extension 
of their right to life, states may defend their property and territory so as to 
safeguard their very existence. Under the jus gentium (taken as an inter-state 
law) states regulate the relations between them on the basis of custom as well 
as written pacts or agreements, in very much the same manner as members of 
a political community regulate the relations among themselves (intra se) on 
matters pertaining to commutative and distributive justice through domestic 
law. Individual states thus establish their own territorial sovereignty and po­
litical immunity, which are in turn mutually recognised by other states. It is 
on this basis, for instance, that the inter-state law guarantees the immunity of 
ambassadors or emissaries in foreign states. 
Taken in its second sense as the jus (in the sense ofboth "law" and "right") 
common to all mankind, the jus gentium also binds each state to respect the 
rights held by individuals living within its territory and irrespective of their 
nationality. Therefore, the jus gentium at once serves to establish and guaran­
tee the sovereignty and immunity of each state in relation to other states, and 
to limit that same sovereignty of an individual state with respect to those liv­
ing within its territory. The limit to sovereignty and political authority arises 
from the consideration that even though an individual is "part of" the state, 
he retains his status as an individual and, consequently, his natural subjective 
rights. Individuals are not ontologically absorbed in the notion of the state 
and, therefore, in the exercise of its legitimate sovereignty the state may not 
violate an individual's basic rights: '[the] state or its ruler does not own the life 
of citizens ... and therefore it may not lightly or ordinarily compel citizens to 
lose their lives.''' 
In Suarez's system, the jus gentium understood as inter-state agreements re­
mains subject to the universal principles of the jus gentium which declare and 
safeguard the fundamental rights of individuals. The violation of such rights 
remains illegitimate even if states agree among themselves that they may be 
violated." Inter-state law is based on the principle of good faith, the pacta sunt 
servanda principle, which binds each state to respect treatises and agreements. 
However, there is a fundamental limit on this principle and on the kind ofagree­
ments it may cover, which has come to be known in modern international law as 
the jus cogens (compelling law), i.e. the set ofperemptory norms which admit no 
derogation. Francisco Suarez was arguably the first theorist to have sustained 
in such a clear manner this fundamental limit to authority on the grounds of 
basic principles, and in this sense he can be seen as a "founding father" ofat least 
one important aspect ofmodern international law.13 However, the next section 
will illustrate why - to Suarez's credit - this deSignation cannot be taken too 
far: international law as it developed in the centuries after his death moved in a 
21 Suarez, De iegiblls, Ill, 30, 5: ' ... quia respublica vel magistratus ejus non habet dominium 
vitae civium ... et ideo non potest exlevibus vel ordinariis causis cogere cives ad perdendam 
vitam.' 
22 Cf.Judge Can,ado Trindade's observation in note 4 above. 

23 See, for instance, David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant and Joanne D. Eisen, 'Is ReSisting Genocide 

a Human Right? ', Notre Dame Law Review, 81:4 (2006), pp.127S-1346 (P.1328). 
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direction quite opposite to the philosopher ofGranada's more holistic and dual­
faceted understanding ofthe jus gentium. 
The Exclusion of the Individual and the 
Reconfiguration ofState Sovereignty 
Suarez wrote his De legibus ac Deo legislatore six years before the beginning of 
the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Beyond the religious pretext which moti­
vated it, this prolonged war involving most European states was nothing less 
than a series of attempts at territorial expansion which consequently chal­
lenged the sovereignty of other states. Since the early sixteenth century, the 
geopolitics of the old continent had changed considerably with the rise and 
consolidation of great nations such as Spain and France and the colonisation 
of the Americas (a subject on which Suarez and other theorists of the School 
of Salamanca wrote extensively). The treatises on the New World, such as 
Francisco de Vitoria's De Indiis and Bartolome De Las Casas' Memorial de Re­
medios para las Indias contain much ofthe groundwork ofwhat later developed 
into international humanitarian and human rights law. In many ways, they 
prefigured the arguments for safeguarding individual and community rights 
against states. By the end of the Thirty Years' War, however, Europe moved 
in an opposite direction. The Treaty ofWestphalia (1648), which sealed the 
end of the conflict and marked the beginning ofthe modern international law 
system, sought to resolve the contentious questions about religious affiliation 
and state sovereignty and immunity respectively. It established the cujus regia 
ejus religio principle, i.e. that the religion of the state (or ruler) determined 
the religion of the citizens (or the ruled). This piecemeal arrangement be­
tween states, which effectively undermined the right and liberty of individu­
als to choose their religion, is emblematic of how far removed the beginning 
of modern international law was from the principles of the early modern jus 
gentium. In this respect, Suarez can hardly be considered a "founding father" 
ofmodern international law. 
The Treaty of Westphalia also recalibrated and exalted the principle of 
state sovereignty, to the extent of mandating that no state could interfere in 
the internal affairs of another state. This implied, in practice, that no state 
could intervene to defend the rights ofpersecuted minorities in another state 
since these were subject exclusively to the domestic laws of that state. In De­
fensorfidei (1613), Suarez had defended the right to intervene on the grounds 
of safeguarding the rights of minorities or of assisting them to depose a ty­
rannical ruler. But the reinforcement of borders through the arrangements 
ofWestphalia had effectively removed the strength of enforceability of indi­
vidual rights found in the earlier notion of jus gentium, which transcended 
borders and viewed individuals primarily as "citizens of the world" and mem­
bers of the community of mankind. Westphalia had established a system of 
international relations and international law that was concerned exclusively 
with inter-state relations. It failed to recognise and engage individuals as true 
subjects of international law, as holders of rights and bearers of obligations. 
For almost three centuries, individuals were practically invisible in the eyes 
SY\1 PO Iii I AM Fof ITF.N~I A; A 1),\ PTAlION" 
of international law. This exclusive state-centricity found sustenance in philo­
sophical underpinnings as diverse as Hegelian idealism and classical legal posi­
tivism. 
Hegel conceived the state as the highest and total expression of individu­
als, the Volksgeist, the unique spirit of the nation that practically obliterated the 
individual personality of its components. This runs directly counter to the on­
tological distinction highlighted earlier in Suarez between the whole and its 
parts, the state and the individuals who compose it. Other legal theorists of the 
"Romantic" period, such as Friedrich Carl von Savigny, spoke ofthe law itself as 
being based on the Volksgeist, the innate consciousness of a people emanating 
from custom!4 As far as its application to international law is concerned, Hege­
lian idealism seems to have won the day over Kant's idea of the jus cosmopoliti­
cum, a law separate from national and international laws which considered the 
rights of both states and individuals and which primarily valued individuals 
as holders of fundamental rights and as "citizens of the world", rather than of 
particular states." 
Classical legal positivism, on the other hand, posited the reductionist ac­
count of legal validity based simply on the agreement of those bound by the 
law, with no reference to objective moral principles. And in the case of inter­
national law, the actors involved were states, not individuals. By this account, 
too, individuals were left aside. It is not a coincidence that after World War II 
legal positivism came in the line of fire of those who accused it of legitimis­
ing the atrocities that were committed, or even providing the legal basis for 
their justification.'6 The major post-war proponent of this legal tradition, H. 
L. A. Hart, went to great lengths to revise Austin's classical utilitarianism and 
question its formalist interpretations, in a bid to show how the positivist thesis 
on the separation between law and morality did not imply or justify the gross 
infringements ofhuman rights perpetrated during the war.'7 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II there was a shared feeling 
about the inadequacy of the exclusively state-centric stance in international 
law which strongly affirmed the principle of non-intervention and acted as 
a gatekeeper of immunities. The Nuremberg trials inaugurated a new era in 
which individuals responsible for crimes could be brought to justice under 
international law, thus giving individuals a standing as bearers of rights and 
24 It wou Id be interesting to investigate the extent to which Savigny's idealisation ofcustomary 
law as the most perfect kind oflaw tallies or otherwise with Suarez's idea of the jus ge"tiu", as 
customary law, but this would require a study far beyond the scope of this article. 
25 It is not a coincidence that this idea was taken up in recent years - in a globalised context - by 
philosophers such as Derrida and Nussbaum . SeeJacgues Derrida, all Cosmopolitanis", alld 
Forgiveness (London: Routledge, 2001) ; Martha Nussbaum, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitan­
ism', Bosto" R eview, 19:5 (1994), PP.3·34. 
26 In his Separate Opi"io" (4 July 2011), §33, Judge Can~ado Trindade relates Distomo to both 
statism and the 'darkness' oflegal positivism . 
27 See, for instance, H . L. A. Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals', Harvard 
Law Review, 71:4 ('958), P),.593-629 (p.6'3 et seq.). On international law, see H. L. A. Hart, The 
Concept ofLaw, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford U.I'. , 1994), chapter 10. 
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responsibilities.'8 In practice, however, there seemed to be a special focus on 
individuals as objects of regulation or bearers of responsibilities, rather than 
as holders of rights. This emphasis on individual obligations with regard to 
international crimes remained visible, for instance, in the fairly recent estab­
lishment of the International Criminal Court. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which was also an outcome of World War II, was gradually 
enshrined in domestic laws and was sustained by the developments in inter­
national human rights and humanitarian law. It also inspired many political 
initiatives and the creation of important regional legal institutions, such as 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). However, the enforcement 
of individual human rights under international law remains a far more prob­
lematic affair than bringing individuals to justice in relation to international ~ crimes such as genocide. While the very notion of legal personality in inter­
national law has changed dramatically since 1945, with individuals becoming 
explicitly subjects of international law, by and large, states still retain a com­
plete monopoly over rights, obligations and access. As Kate Parlett puts it, 
-
there still is a clear'differential treatment of states and individuals: between 
active subjects and passive recipients of rights and obligations in the interna­
tionallegal system.'" The fact that Parlett's very recent book on The Individu­
al in the International Legal System is one of the very few comprehensive treat­
ments of this subject says a lot about the need to sustain future developments 
with serious scholarship.30 The main question that arises here is whether the 
current predominant status of individuals as passive recipients of rights and 
obligations is sufficient to provide for individuals' adequate access to justice. 
Judge Canc;:ado Trindade dedicated a book to this subject, in which he argues 
that the right to access to justice is a right which belongs to the domain of 
the jus cogens, since it lies at the very basis of a legal systemY His Dissenting 
Opinion accompanying the ICJ'S final judgement on the Distomo case is very 
much based on the argument that, in his view, the Court's majority had failed 
to take into consideration the status of individuals as holders of rights, thus 
reducing a matter arising from the breach of fundamental rights to a consid­
eration ofstate jurisdiction and immunity. 
Returning towards a Dovetail Approach? 
The judgement in the case concerning the Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State opposing Germany to Italy illustrates the earlier observation that states 
still retain a monopoly over rights, obligations and access. It also shows that 
28 Exceptions in the pre-Nuremberg world bore little or no influence on the development of 
international law until then. 
29 Kate Parlett, Tlte Individual in the International Legal System (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 
201l), pp.352-253 
30 See also Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in Illtenlatiollal Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
U.P., 2010), especially Part Ill. 
31 Antonio Augusto Can~ado Trindade, The Access of Illdividuais to International Justice (Ox· 
ford: Oxford U. P., 2011). 
SYMPO~IA MI:.LITENSIA : AOAPTATIONS 
the issue of access to justice is an important test for assessing the role of indi­
viduals in the international legal system. In this case, it was clear that the ICJ'S 
decision would affect individuals (the families of the victims of the Distomo 
massacre). It was only at the stage of Greece's successful application to inter­
vene in the proceedings that the interests of individuals seem to have been 
given some consideration, and this was because in that particular instance 
their interests coincided with the interests ofa state. Although they were, in a 
way, holders of rights and bearers ofobligations under international law, their 
role in the international legal system was manifestly passive in this particu­
lar case which concerned them directly. While the individuals involved had 
made direct recourse to domestic courts (in Greece, Germany and Italy) and 
European courts (the ECHR), they could not intervene as individuals in the 
proceedings of a case which considered the jurisdiction of the courts before 
which they had previously appeared as litigating parties, and therefore the va­
lidity or otherwise of the judgments directly affecting them. The individuals 
suddenly receded to a passive back seat position. While Greece was allowed 
to intervene in order to 'inform' the Court on matters pertaining to or affect­
ing its interest, the individuals concerned do not enjoy analogous rights under 
any provision similar to Article 62 of the IC] Statute. Yet the situation is not so 
bleak: even though the judgement ultimately failed to give individuals both 
material and formal access to justice (due to international law as it stands to­
day), the Order allowing Greece to intervene earlier in the proceedings may 
set an important standard for future jurisprudence. In his Separate Opinion 
supporting the majority of judges in the Order accepting Greece's request, 
Judge Can<;ado Trindade notes that... 
this is a case which has a direct bearing on the evolution of inter­
national law in our times. There is no reason for keeping on over­
working the rights of States while at the same time overlooking 
the rights ofindividuals. One and the other are meant to develop 
pari passu in our days .. . State immunity and the fundamental 
rights of the human person are not to exclude each other, as that 
would make immunity unacceptably tantamount to impunity." 
He further observes that since the case in question had its origins in 
breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law, 'we cannot 
approach a matter like that of the jurisdictional immunities of the State ... 
from a strictly inter-State dimension. In the present proceedings before the 
Court [i.e . Order, not the Judgement], consideration has been given to States 
as tituiaires of rights, as well as to individuals as titu/aires of rights.'3' The 
judge argues that Greece was given the right to intervene even in virtue ofthe 
fact that it manifestly represented the interest of the individuals concerned. 
Through the 'resurrectio of intervention in present-day litigation,' after it had 
'lay dormant in the Peace Palace [i.e. the lC;'S headquaters in The Hague] for 
most of the time of the Court's history,' future developments in international 
32 Separate Opinion (4july 201l), §S4­
33 Ibid., §60 
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jurisprudence may come to satisfy the needs not only ofthe States concerned, 
but of the individuals concerned as well, 'and ultimately of the international 
community as a whole, in the conceptual universe of the new jus gentium of 
our times.'H As the judge himselfnotes, our times do not quite aspire to some 
sort ofworld-state, a civitas maxima gentium ruled by the jus gentium, but there 
seems to be 'an aspiration ... to the effect of the construction of an interna­
tionallegal order applicable both to States (and international organisations) 
and to individuals, pursuant to certain universal standards ofjustice.'35 
The fact that the case before the IC] traces its origins to the Distomo mas­
sacre shows not only the short lapse of time between then and now, but also 
how international legal institutions which have been established in the mean­
time operate within a framework of differential treatment of individuals and 
states in both substantive and procedural aspects ofinternational law. But the 
reconfiguration of the roles ofstates and individuals in the internationallegal 
system is a continuously evolving process. Jurisprudence (in both senses of 
the word, as philosophy oflaw and as case law) contributes in no mean way to 
this process. The learned opinions expressed in judgements or opinions such 
as the ones cited above contain much that is ofphilosophical importance and 
just goes to show why this area of inquiry falls within the domain ofpractical 
philosophy. Ultimately, the central questions on the legal personality of indi­
viduals in international law and on what constitutes true subjects of interna­
tionallaw are philosophical questions that engage legal philosophers as well 
as jurists and practitioners in the field. These contemporary analytic discus­
sions in legal and political philosophy can draw much inspiration from the 
views and perspectives of past authors. Even though they wrote in a signifi­
cantly different world, their views form part ofa long tradition which enhanc­
es the meaning of present-day realities. In the words ofJohn Cottingham, a 
leading British analytic philosopher who does not suffer from the historio­
phobia that so often affects many ofhis colleagues, ... 
philosophical argument does not spring out of nowhere [but] is 
part of a cultural tradition that delivered us to where we are to­
day; and ifwe ignore that tradition, we will lack fu II awareness of 
the significance of the philosophical moves we make, with po­
tentially disastrous results.36 
This applies to legal and political philosophy as much as it applies to phi­
losophy in general - and perhaps even more so, since law and politics are by 
their very nature historically and culturally situated. Views such as those ex­
pounded by Suarez, who considered both states and individuals as being at 
once safeguarded and bound by the jus gentium, can be quite enlightening. It 
follows from the common understanding of jus (which Suarez calls the 'the 
proper object of justice') as the link between justice (justitia) and law (lex) 
34 Ibid., §S6, §61 
3S Ibid., §36 
36 John Cottingham, 'Why Should Analytic Philosophers Do History of philo sophy', in Ana­
lytic Philosophy and History ofPhilosophy, ed. by Tom Sorrell and G. A. J. Rogers (Oxford: 
Oxford V.P., 2005), pp.2S-41 (P.39). 
!-ol'MP()SIA MELITENSIA: ADAPTATIONSLIS 
that any law or legal system, including international law, is not quite fully a 
law (jus) if, for instance, it limits or lacks the access to justice. And in inter­
national law, it is not only states that should have formal access to justice at 
international level, but also individuals. Without access, justice cannot be ful­
ly realised. It is equally important, however, not to see successful initiatives 
such as the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights as the 
mere emancipation of the individual-versus-state-centricity. Indeed, state­
centricity should not necessarily be seen in a pejorative manner, as long as the 
rights of individuals are recognised (including the right to access to justice in 
international law) and their capacity enabled. There is little benefit in con­
tinuing to view the individual and the state as exclusive of one another, rather 
then seek ways of integrating their respective roles. This is what political de­
velopment in democratic societies is ultimately about: a democratic society 
based on the rule oflaw crystallises the rights of the individual vis-a.-vis the 
state, but it does not in any way render the state useless, nor does it obliterate 
its sovereignty. Ifanything, it places the state at the service of the individual. 
And this is perhaps what states should be made more aware of when envis­
aging and constructing the international legal order. Rather than being self­
serving, the interests ofstates can and should take into account and enhance 
the role of individuals as true subjects of international law. The possibilities 
for doing so have increased multi-fold through the reconfiguration in recent 
decades of the very idea of sovereignty in a landscape of increased regional 
and international cooperation, networking and sometimes integration, as 
part ofthe overall process ofglobalisation. Legal theory and international law 
should follow on this process, not only with respect to arrangements regulat­
ing relations between countries and groupings, but also with regard to where 
the individual stands vis-a.-vis the state. In spite ofall the problems it faces, de­
mocratisation has often worked quite well in domestic and regional legislative 
settings and juridical practices. There is no reason in principle why it should 
not work well at the level of international law. There is enough experience, or 
custom, to push for a move in this direction. After all, as Suarez reminds us, 
the legal customs of particular states lie at the basis of the jus gentium. The 
same could apply to the jus gentium ofour times. 
What we are looking at here goes beyond the 'resurrection' (as the judge 
calls it) of the right to intervene. At least some of the salient developments in 
international law and politics over the last seventy years or so have resurrect­
ed some ofthe key features ofthe early modern idea of the jus gentium, such as 
that formulated by Suarez, whose ideal of a universal community is actually 
being facilitated and made possible through the process of globalisation and 
democratisation. This marks a renewed aspiration of an international legal 
order which the Westphalian system, operating between then and now, had 
effectively euthanized. The principles of the early modern jus gentium which 
avoided placing state sovereignty and individual rights at loggerheads, to­
gether with the dovetail approach of sixteenth and seventeenth century phi­
losophers such as the one illustrated in fairly broad strokes above, have a lot to 
teach us as we explore possible future directions in international law. 
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